By Ron Freedman

Ron Freedman is CEO of Research Infosource Inc.

“Canada needs to put science, technology and innovation at the core of economic Policy,” begins a recent Research Money article. Really?

Does the federal government actually have any policies? Do we have a national transportation policy, agriculture policy, foreign affairs policy, defence policy, environmental policy, fisheries policy, health policy, etc., etc., etc.? Short answer: no.

Why, then, does anyone expect us to formulate an economic policy, let alone an offshoot STI policy? The same goes for “strategies”. “Canada needs a national (fill in the blank) strategy”, we so often hear.

The fact is, Canada operates more or less successfully (you be the judge) without policies or strategies. What we do have is programs. In the STI realm, we have scores and scores and scores of them. Sometimes one can infer the vague outline of a policy from a program or group of programs. But not often. Programs have no need of policies.

Virtually every department and agency runs a suite of programs. Programs are the lifeblood of government. They give meaning to the work of politicians and civil servants.  Programs are the day-to-day raison d’être of government, a reminder to us all of what governments and taxes do to improve our lives. And, for every perceived problem or opportunity, we necessarily invent a program. After all, programs provide evidence of action. (“I am pleased to announce that our government is taking action on . . .,” intone government ministers.)

These programs range from quite useful to largely symbolic. Occasionally, they are game-changing.

A problem with programs – at least with new ones - is that they are by nature marginal. After 158 years of continuous government in Canada, one would think that we would have put in place at least one program to address each of the major problems or opportunities facing the country, including those related to STI. It certainly seems so in the world of STI, where programs (and departments and agencies) appear to be tripping over one another to demonstrate action.

By definition, the next program to be invented must slot between or beside all the other programs. In other words, it will be incremental. In contemporary parlance somebody or something – an interest group or a party political platform, or sometimes an enthusiastic politician or an advisor – identifies a new “program gap” and a new program is duly invented to fill that gap. One would think that after many years of filling gaps, the new gaps have become smaller and smaller and the programs less and less consequential.

Time to reform and consolidate programs

One aspect of programs is that they are seldom retired. By the time that the need for retirement becomes obvious there are vocal vested interests ready to defend the program, no matter how outmoded or ineffective. It matters not that the original conditions that prompted the creation of the program may have radically changed.

By that time, there is also a cadre of program administrators whose livelihoods depend on the programs’ continuance. Politicians are loathe to retire programs because they believe that to do so is a tacit admission of the programs’ failure (and by implication that of the government that created them or kept them going.)

Occasionally, programs are fine-tuned, but seldom are they completely retired or replaced. Mostly, they just sail on.

Of course, there are ways to cull programs that can free up money for new programs. Former prime minister Paul Martin tried this in 1995 when he declared that all departments would need to cut their budgets by 35 percent in order to bring the federal budget under control. This top-down sledgehammer approach worked to a degree. Certainly, it reduced the government’s overall expenditures. But its main purpose was not to reform programs, only to reduce expenditures. (In any event, the bulk of federal government spending is transfers to individuals and other levels of government, so program reviews such as Martin’s only ever save small amounts of money in the grand scheme.) Many under-performing programs were left in place, just with smaller budgets.

Another approach to program reformation is zero-based budgeting, a concept that has fallen out of favour in recent years. In zero-based budgeting, authorities ask a simple question of each program (or indeed of each governmental organization): “If we didn’t have program (or organization) X today, would we create it?” If not, then the program or organization goes. If it still serves a useful (policy) purpose, then does it need to be changed in some way? If so, how?

Zero-based budgeting has never gained favour because it requires real hard-nosed analysis. For example, successful programming needs accurate data, up-to-date completive analysis and modern delivery models. It demands that governments make tough choices, which they are loathe to do except in extremis. And thus, the ship of state sails on, apparently without the need for policies or strategies.

So, is the problem that Canada has no policies or strategies, STI or otherwise, or is it that many of our programs are possibly in need of consolidation and reform, and that no one can be bothered? You be the judge.

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