Engineering science policy for the nation

By Paul Dufour

RE$EARCH MONEY readers may be familiar with the 1945 Science-The Endless Frontier report written at the end of WWII by Vannevar Bush —US president Harry Truman's science advisor and engineer. It set the stage for a re-tooling of support and re-organization of science in the reconstruction era, and led to the creation of the National Science Foundation. As a classic touchstone for the influence of science in policy-making, it has a considerable following not only in the US but across the world.

A Blueprint for Canada's Emerging Science Landscape

Fifty years ago, a similarly influential report (but not as well known) was in the making by another former war-time science adviser and engineer, C.J. (Jack) Mackenzie. As the National Research Council's president, he had been instrumental during WWII in advising government on its military and nuclear research efforts and collaborating with his allied counterparts. Under Mackenzie, the NRC staff reached 2000 and was reorganized to provide a stronger foundation to support basic science and industry development. In 1963, he was appointed special advisor by prime minister LB Pearson to provide counsel on the organization of government scientific activities. Mackenzie wrote an informal progress report on January 28, 1964 to the PM, making several recommendations. They were:

1) A Central Scientific Bureau or Secretariat to be established in the PM's office to assemble, digest, and analyse all information concerning the government's S&T activities and their inter-relations with university, industry and provincial scientific establishments. It would have no executive authority but would be staffed by a small group with sound credentials.

2) A National Committee on Scientific Policy (NCSP) to assess the government scientific activities for the purpose of: a) forming judgements on the adequacy of support for research and how well it's balanced within universities, industry and federal and provincial institutions; b) prioritizing broad areas of research and determining which should be given the most support in the interest of the country and economic prosperity; and, c) providing an annual report to the PM.

Mackenzie also suggested key studies that the proposed NCSP should undertake, including the training, supply and demand for scientific personnel; support for civilian R&D; and the reappraisal of the roles for university, private sector and federal and provincial research establishments. Finally, he argued that consideration should be given to establishing a re-invigorated Federal Panel on S&T, comprised of DMs and heads of scientific agencies feeding into the NCSP.

It is worth remembering that the government of the day was itself undergoing considerable re-engineering. A three-person Royal Commission on Government Organization had been established in 1963 (the Glassco Commission) tasked with examining scientific R&D activities.

Federal government R&D spending more than doubled from $107 million in 1951-52 to $258 million in 1961-62 and performance of R&D by the federal sector had almost tripled in the same period. With this growth, coordination of government scientific activities had become an obvious target of public policy (the GERD-GDP ratio for Canada was 0.72% in 1959-60 compared to 2.58% in the US and 2.11% in the UK).

The Glassco Commission examined the machinery for scientific policy, reviewing the respective roles of the NRC, PCO and a moribund federal advisory panel for scientific policy. Eschewing the need for either a science department or science minister, it argued for a ‘Cabinet spark plug' — a Central Scientific Bureau operating under the president of the Treasury Board along with a National Scientific Advisory Council to submit independent scientific advice for policy making. In several respects, the Mackenzie report had picked up from the Glassco recommendations and fine-tuned them.

In a speech several months later to the Royal Society of Canada, Canada's first Industry minister, C M Drury (who later become the new S&T Minister), took up the Mackenzie report and challenged his audience for "assistance and advice in the urgent need to formulate a Canadian Science Policy which is truly national in character and domain".

Based on the Mackenzie and Glassco reports, a Science Secretariat was created along with a Science Council of Canada (1966). And, in partial response to minister Drury's challenge, a decade long series of public debates emerged with the Special Committee of the Senate on Science Policy (Maurice Lamontagne) ultimately leading to Canada's first-ever science ministry and forward-looking research policies.

And Five Decades On?

Today, a half century later, we can be forgiven in thinking that Canada's science policy has much evolved. A revision of the seven-year old federal S&T strategy is finally underway, though it is clearly late as many of Canada's competitors have moved on including China whose GERD-GDP ratio is now well above that of Canada's.

To be sure, the Jenkins expert panel and various other studies have pointed to key steps, but policy actions will need to take on more urgency. Some provinces have gone forward with their own plans, and a pan-Canadian approach to mobilize the country's knowledge assets for social and economic development will be difficult at best. The science (and innovation) policy landscape is mutating rapidly and the scientific and business leadership must be more proactive in making the case for S&T.

In the mid 60s and 70s, science—especially government research capacity — was seen as a prime player in the overall future direction of the nation and public dialogue was real and intense. Science was at the frontier of Canada's economic and social revival. Then, the government was seizing the moment. Today, it threatens to become a mere appendage to policy rhetoric.

What the 1964 Mackenzie report serves to remind us is that getting the right people together with the right receptor at the right time with the right conviction can be more critical to any success than ideal org charts, vision-less policy, and risk-averse leadership. As the federal and other levels of government scope out new forays in seeking the genuine contributions of science and innovation towards Canada's 2017 celebrations, we would do well to heed the Mackenzie philosophy in focusing the spotlight on expanding our own endless knowledge frontiers for — and with — Canadians.

Paul Dufour is a fellow and adjunct professor, ISSP, University of Ottawa.